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Abstract. First-generation blockchains provide probabilistic finality: a block can
be revoked, albeit the probability decreases as the block “sinks” deeper into the
chain. Recent proposals revisited committee-based BFT consensus to provide deter-
ministic finality: as soon as a block is validated, it is never revoked. A distinguishing
characteristic of these second-generation blockchains over classical BFT protocols
is that committees change over time as the participation and the blockchain state
evolve. In this paper, we push forward in this direction by proposing a formalization
of the Dynamic Repeated Consensus problem and by providing generic procedures
to solve it in the context of blockchains.
Our approach is modular in that one can plug in different synchronizers and single-
shot consensus instances. To offer a complete solution, we provide a concrete in-
stantiation, called Tenderbake, and present a blockchain synchronizer and a single-
shot consensus algorithm, working in a Byzantine and partially synchronous sys-
tem model with eventually synchronous clocks. In contrast to recent proposals, our
methodology is driven by the need to bound the message buffers. This is essential in
preventing spamming and run-time memory errors. Moreover, Tenderbake processes
can synchronize with each other without exchanging messages, leveraging instead the
information stored in the blockchain.
1 Introduction
Besides raising public interest, blockchains have also recently gained traction in the scien-
tific community. The underlying technology combines advances in several domains, most
notably from distributed computing, cryptography, and economics, in order to provide
novel solutions for achieving trust in decentralized and dynamic environments.
Our work has been initially motivated by Tezos [13,1], a blockchain platform that dis-
tinguishes itself through its self-amendment mechanism: protocol changes are proposed and
voted upon. This feature makes Tezos especially appealing as a testbed for experiment-
ing with different consensus algorithms to understand their strengths and suitability in the
blockchain context. Tezos relies upon a consensus mechanism build on top of a liquid proof-
of-stake system, meaning that block production and voting rights are given to participants
in proportion to their stake and that participants can delegate their rights to other stake-
holders. As Nakamoto consensus [17,12], Tezos’ current consensus algorithm [20] achieves
only probabilistic finality assuming an attacker with at most half of the total stake, and
relying on a synchrony assumption.
The initial goal of this work was to strengthen the resilience of Tezos through a BFT
consensus protocol to achieve deterministic finality while relaxing the synchrony assump-
tion. We had two general requirements that we found were missing in the existing BFT
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consensus protocols. First, for security reasons, message buffers need to be bounded: assum-
ing unbounded buffers may lead to memory errors, which can be caused either accidentally
or maliciously, through spamming for instance. Second, as previously observed [2], plug-
ging a classical BFT consensus protocol in a blockchain setting with a proof-of-stake boils
down to solve a form of repeated consensus [9], where each consensus instance (i) produces
a block, i.e., the decided value, and (ii) runs among a committee of processes which are
selected based on their stake. To be applicable to open blockchains, committees need to
be dynamic and change frequently. Allowing frequent committee changes is fundamental
in blockchains for mainly two reasons: (i) it is not desirable to let a committee be respon-
sible for producing blocks for too long, for neither fairness nor security; (ii) the stake of
participants may change frequently.
Dynamic Repeated Consensus. In this paper, we propose a formalization of the dy-
namic repeated consensus (DRC) problem and provide generic procedures to solve it in
the context of blockchains. What is specific to DRC is a selection function that chooses
committees based on values already decided. Such selection functions are readily available
as blockchains store the (delegated) stake of each participant. Contrary to state machine
replication (SMR), DRC can be solved with always changing committees. For this reason
we think that, in the context of open blockchains, DRC is a better notion than SMR. We
discuss their relation more thoroughly later in the paper.
To solve DRC, we follow the methodology initially presented in [10] and revived more
recently in [26,18,19]: we decouple the logic for synchronizing the processes in consensus
instances from the consensus logic itself. Thus our solution uses two main generic ingredi-
ents: a synchronizer and a single-shot consensus skeleton. Our approach is modular in that
one can plug in different synchronizers and single-shot consensus algorithms. Our solution
works in a partially synchronous model where the bound on the message delay is unknown,
and the communication is lossy before the global stabilization time (GST). We note that
losing messages is a consequence of processes having bounded memory: if a message is
received when the buffers are full, then it is dropped.
Blockchain-based Synchronizer. The need for and the benefits of decoupling the syn-
chronizer from the consensus logic have already been pointed out in [26,18,19]. Indeed,
such separation of concerns allows reusability and simpler proofs. We continue this line
of work and propose a synchronizer for DRC which does not exchange messages. Instead,
it relies upon local clocks while leveraging information already stored in the blockchain.
Our solution allows buffers to be bounded and guarantees that correct processes in the
synchronous period are always in the same round, except for negligeable periods of time
due to clock drifts. Thus processes can discard all the messages not associated with their
current or next round. This is in contrast with existing solutions, which, in principle, need
to store messages for an unbounded number of rounds.
Consensus algorithm. To complete our DRC solution, Tenderbake, we also present a
single-shot consensus algorithm. Single-shot Tenderbake is inspired by Tendermint [4,3], in
turn inspired by PBFT [5] and DLS [10]. We improve Tendermint in two aspects: i) we re-
move the reliable broadcast requirement, and ii) we provide faster termination. Tendermint
terminates once processes synchronize in the same round after GST, in the worst case, in
n rounds, where n is the size of the committee. Single-shot Tenderbake terminates in f +2
rounds, where f is the upper bound on the number of Byzantine processes. Tenderbake
departs from its closest relatives Tendermint and HotStuff [26] in that it is driven by a
bounded-buffers design leveraging a synchronizer that paces protocol phases on timeouts
only. However, the price for this is that Tenderbake is not optimistic responsive as HotStuff,
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which makes progress at the speed of the network and terminates in f + 1 rounds, at the
cost of an additional phase. As a last difference, we note that, contrary to recent pipelined
algorithms [26,6], Tenderbake lends itself better to open blockchains. Pipelined algorithms
focus more on performance, however pipelining imposes restrictions on how much and how
frequently committees can change [6].
Further related work. We are not aware of any existing approach providing a complete,
generic DRC formalization. However, several references exist for particular aspects which
we touch upon. For instance, repeated consensus with bounded buffers has been studied
in [9,24] but in system models which assume crash failures only. Working solutions for
implementing dynamic committees are (partially) documented in [7,15,14,22,25,21]. The
differences with respect to the closest relatives of single-shot Tenderbake have been dis-
cussed above.
Outline. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines the system model; Sec-
tion 3 formalizes the DRC problem, compares it to the SMR problem, and proposes a
generic solution; Section 4 proposes a synchronizer leveraging blockchain’s immutability;
Sections 5 - 6 present the single-shot consensus skeleton and respectively single-shot Ten-
derbake, its instantiation; Section 7 discusses message complexity and gives an upper bound
on the recovery time after GST; Section 8 concludes. Appendix A contains a more techni-
cal discussion on relation between DRC and SMR, while Appendix B contains the detailed
correctness proofs of Tenderbake.
2 System Model
We consider a message-passing distributed system composed of a possibly infinite set Π
of processes. Processes have access to digital signing and hashing algorithms. We assume
that cryptography is perfect: digital signatures cannot be forged, and there are no hash
collisions. Each process has an associated public/private key pair for signing and processes
can be identified by their public keys.
Execution model. Processes repeatedly run consensus instances to decide output values.
New output values are appended to a chain that processes maintain locally. Consensus
instances run in phases. The execution of a phase consists in broadcasting some messages
(possibly none), retrieving messages, and updating the process state. At the end of a phase
a correct process exits the current phase and starts the next phase. We consider that
message sending and state updating are instantaneous, because their execution times are
negligible in comparison to message transmission delays. This means that the duration of
a phase is given by the amount of time dedicated to message retrieval.
Partial synchrony.We assume a partially synchronous system, where after some unknown
time τ (the global stabilization time, GST) the system becomes synchronous and channels
reliable, that is, there is a finite unknown bound δ on the message transfer delay. Before τ
the system is asynchronous and channels are lossy.
We assume that processes have access to local clocks and that after τ these clocks are
loosely synchronized: at any time after τ , the difference between the real time and the local
clock of a process is bounded by some constant ρ, which, as δ, is a priori unknown.
We consider that message sending and state updating are instantaneous, because their
execution times are negligible in comparison to message transmission delays.
Fault model. Processes can be correct or faulty. Correct processes follow the protocol,
while faulty ones exhibit Byzantine behavior by arbitrarily deviating from the protocol.
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Communication primitives. We assume the presence of two communication primitives
built on top of point-to-point channels, where exchanged messages are authenticated. The
first primitive is a best-effort broadcast primitive used by processes participating in a
consensus instance and the second is a pull primitive which can be used by any process.
Broadcasting messages is done by invoking the primitive broadcast. This primitive pro-
vides the following guarantees: (i) integrity, meaning that each message is delivered at most
once and only some process previously broadcast it; (ii) validity, meaning that after τ if
a correct process broadcasts a message m at time t, then every correct process eventually
receives m by time t + δ. For simplicity, we assume that processes also send messages to
themselves. Processes are notified of the reception of a message with a NewMessage event.
Retrieving output values from other processes is done by invoking the pullChain primi-
tive. This primitive guarantees that if invoked by a process p at some time t > τ then p will
eventually receive all the output values decided by correct processes before t. The pullChain
primitive can also be used to retrieve protocol-specific data associated with output values,
such as certifications for decided values. Let us note that the pull primitive can be im-
plemented in such a way that the caller does not need to pull all output values, but only
the ones that it misses. Furthermore, output values can be grouped and thus received as a
chain of values. Processes are notified of the reception of a chain with a NewChain event.
3 Dynamic Repeated Consensus
In this section, we define the problem of dynamic repeated consensus, we briefly compare it
to the problem of state machine replication and we propose a generic framework to solve it.
3.1 Problem definition
Originally, repeated consensus was defined as an infinite sequence of consensus instances
executed by the same set of processes, with processes having to agree on an infinitely
growing sequence of decision values [9]. Dynamic repeated consensus, instead, considers
that each consensus instance is executed by a potentially different set of n processes where
n is a parameter of the problem. More precisely, given the i-th consensus instance, only
n processes Πi ⊆ Π participate in the consensus instance proposing values and deciding
a value vi. Processes in Π −Πi can only adopt vi. Therefore output values can be either
directly decided or adopted. We assume that every correct process agrees a priori upon on
a value v0.
To know the committee, each process has access to a deterministic selection function
committee that returns a sequence of processes based on previous output values. More
precisely, the committee Πi is given by committee([v0]) for i ≤ k and by committee(v¯p[..(i−
k)]) for i > k, where k > 0 is a problem parameter, v¯p denotes the sequence of output
values of process p, and s¯[..j] denotes the prefix of length j + 1 of the sequence s¯. Each
process calls committee with its own decided values; however since decided values are agreed
upon, committee returns the same sequence when called by different correct processes. We
note that the sets Πi are potentially unrelated to each other, and any pair of subsequent
committees may differ. However, we assume that in each committee, less than a third of
the members are faulty. For convenience, we consider the worst case: n = 3f +1, and each
committee contains exactly f faulty processes.
Dynamic repeated consensus, as repeated consensus, needs to satisfy three properties:
agreement, validity, and termination. Agreement and termination have the same formula-
tion for both problems. However, validity needs to reflect the dynamic aspect of committees.
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To this end, we define validity employing two predicates. The first one is isLegitimateValue.
When given as input a value vi, isLegitimateValue(vi) returns true if the value has been pro-
posed by a legitimate process, e.g. a process inΠi. The second predicate is isConsistentValue.
When given as input two consecutive output values vi, vi−1, isConsistentValue(vi, vi−1) re-
turns true if vi is consistent with vi−1. This predicate takes into account the fact that
an output value depends on the previous one, as commonly assumed in blockchains. For
instance, when output values are blocks containing transactions, a valid block must include
the identifier or hash of the previous block, and transactions must not conflict with those
already decided. For conciseness, we define isValidValue(vi, vi−1) as a predicate that returns
true if both isLegitimateValue(vi) and isConsistentValue(vi, vi−1) return true for i > 0. Note
that the use of an application-defined predicate for stating validity already appears in [2,8].
An algorithm that solves the Dynamic Repeated Consensus problem must satisfy the
following three properties:
– (termination) Every correct process p has an infinite output.
– (agreement) If v¯p and v¯q are the sequences of output values of two correct processes p
and q, then v¯p is a prefix of v¯q or v¯q is a prefix of v¯p.
– (validity) If v¯p is the sequence of output values of a correct process p, then the predicate
isValidValue(v¯p[i],v¯p[i− 1]) is satisfied for any i > 0.
We use s¯[i] to denote the (i+ 1)-th element of the sequence s¯.
3.2 Relation between DRC and SMR
Can DRC be used to solve SMR? The answer depends on the dynamic model assumed for
committees. Indeed, DRC does not impose any constraint on the membership of consensus
instances: the consensus set can change infinitely often. On the other hand, for liveness,
SMR needs the membership to stabilize: eventually the replica set remains fixed or changes
only imply re-electing old members.
The intuition is the following: if any process p (a client) sends a request to execute an
operation (a transaction in a blockchain system) and the process q receiving the request
does not belong to a consensus instance (it is not a state machine replica), q cannot
serve the request. The client p has to contact the current consensus instance. Through the
pullChain primitive, p will ask for already decided output values to retrieve the history of
consensus sets via the selection committee function and can (repeatedly) send its request to
the committees she knows of. However, a race condition between always new output values
and p readings on the prefix can happen. If the system keeps replacing old members with
newly joined ones, p might know about the new ones a bit too late, when the committee
has already terminated to serve incoming requests; and this scenario can repeat infinitely
often.
What is needed to solve this liveness issue is either (i) a period of time sufficiently long
in which no new output value is decided or (ii) a same set of correct processes elected
infinitely often. Let us note that the latter condition is always true if the set of validators
is finite in each run and committee members are a subset of those. To illustrate this point,
let us consider a scenario in which q ∈ Π is elected in the odd consensus instances but
not in the even ones. Eventually, the p’s request (while still pending) will reach q in some
consensus instance, because q is elected an infinite number of times. Eventually a same set
of correct replicas will be elected infinitely often, then the request will reach the correct
processes of some consensus instance.
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In Appendix A the interested reader can find a more formal discussion about the solv-
ability of SMR in dynamic models admitted by DRC, initially introduced in [16]. The
main result is that SMR cannot be solved without restricting the committee members to
be chosen from a finite set of validators. This condition is not always compatible with
the necessity in blockchains of electing participants on the basis of dynamic economical
parameters such as the stakes, whose variations depend on the actual exchanges among
participants and rewarding mechanisms.
In summary, DRC can be viewed as a weaker problem than SMR, since it can be solved
with always changing membership of consensus instances and it is suitable for blockchains.
3.3 DRC for blockchains
A blockchain is a sequence of chained blocks. The head of a blockchain is the last block in the
sequence. The block level is its position in the sequence, with the first block having level 0.
A block has a header and a content, typically consisting of a sequence of transactions. As
the block content is application-specific, we do not model it further. We assume, though,
that the block content represents some value to be agreed upon. As for the block header,
it includes the level of the block and the hash of the previous block, among possibly other
fields that are specific to the consensus algorithm. The hash is needed because, as opposed
to single-shot consensus, in DRC it is not enough to agree on a block content alone: one
needs to relate block contents at subsequent levels. Consequently, the output value to be
agreed upon consists, at least, of the block content u of the currently proposed block and the
hash h of the previous block. For convenience, we consider that the tuples (u, h) represent
the output values in v¯ from the DRC definition in Section 3.1.
We consider that the pullChain primitive retrieves blocks instead of just output values.
Note that, thanks to the block hashes, agreement on the output values implies agreement
on the whole blockchain, except for its head, for which there might not yet be agreement
on the other fields of the header besides the predecessor hash. We also note that the genesis
block (i.e. the first block in the blockchain) corresponds to the output value v¯[0], which
was assumed to be agreed upon a priori.
Fig. 1 presents the pseudocode of a generic procedure to solve DRC in the context of
blockchains. It is generic in that it can run with any single-shot consensus algorithm. In
the pseudocode, we use the function hash to compute the hash of some input. The function
length returns the length of an input sequence.
The state of any process p running DRC consists of the variables it maintains:messagesp,
its message buffer; blockchainp, its local copy of the blockchain; ℓp, its current level,
which equals the length of its blockchain; hp, the hash of the block at level ℓp − 1;
and headCertificatep, a certificate justifying its last decided value, where a certificate is typi-
cally a set of signatures from a quorum of committee members. The variable headCertificatep
is used when p responds to a pullChain request: in addition to the blockchain (or the part
that the requester is missing), p also sends its headCertificatep to certify its last decided
value. In the pseudocode, all these state variables are considered global, while local variables
are those that do not have a subscript.
The entry point of the DRC algorithm is the procedure runDRC in Fig. 1. We note that
processes need not start DRC at the same time. When executing runDRC, a process starts
by scheduling calls to pullChain. Then, using updateState, it initializes its local variables,
namely the state variables already presented and the variables specific to the single-shot
algorithm. Then, the process iteratively runs consensus instances and once an instance has
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1 proc runDRC()
2 schedule onTimeoutPull() to be executed after I
3 updateState([genesis], ∅)
4 while true
5 (chain, certificate) := runConsensusInstance()
6 updateState(chain, certificate)
7 proc updateState(chain, certificate)
8 blockchainp := chain
9 headCertificatep := certificate
10 ℓp := length(chain)
11 hp := hash(blockchainp[ℓp − 1])
12 messagesp := ∅
13 initConsensusInstance()
14 proc onTimeoutPull()
15 pullChain
16 schedule onTimeoutPull() to be executed after I
17 proc handleEvents()
18 while not stopEventHandler() do
19 upon NewMessage(msg)
20 handleConsensusMessage(msg)
21 upon NewChain(c, headCertificate)
22 if validChain(c, headCertificate) and
23 betterChain(c) then
24 return (c, headCertificate)
Fig. 1: DRC entry point and auxiliary procedures.
finished, it updates its state accordingly. Normally, a consensus instance simply decides on
a value, and the corresponding block is appended to the blockchain. However, a process
might also be behind other processes which have already taken decisions for more than one
level. In this case, as soon as the process invokes the pullChain primitive, it retrieves missed
decisions and thus possibly more blocks are appended to the blockchain.
We note that in the presence of dynamic committees, it is not enough that processes
call pullChain punctually when they are behind. Indeed, assume that a process p decides
at level ℓ but the others are not aware of this and have not decided, because the relevant
messages were lost; also assume that p is no longer a member of the committee at level
ℓ + 1, consequently, it no longer broadcasts messages and thus the other processes cannot
progress. To solve this, each process invokes pullChain regularly, every I time units, where
I > 0 is some constant.
Remark 1. In practice, given an estimate δmax of the maximum message delay δ, I should
be chosen bigger than δmax , as it is not useful to invoke the pull primitive more often than
once every δ time units.
During the execution of a consensus instance, processes continuously handle events to
update their state. The event processing loop is implemented by the handleEvents proce-
dure in Fig. 1. The termination of the event handler is controlled by the stopEventHandler
procedure, which is specific to the single-shot consensus algorithm. There are two kinds of
events: message receipts, represented by the NewMessage event, and chain receipts, repre-
sented by the NewChain event. Upon receiving a new message msg, a process p dispatches
it to the consensus instance. Upon the receipt of a new chain, p updates its own chain if the
new chain is valid and is better, as explained later. In addition to the chain, the NewChain
event includes a certification headCertificate of the chain’s head, which justifies that the
head’s value has indeed been agreed upon.
Both procedures validChain and betterChain are specific to the single-shot consensus
algorithm, thus we abstract away their implementations. We note, however, that, typically,
betterChain(c) checks that c is longer than p’s current blockchain. The role of validChain(c)
is to check whether c is valid and whether c’s head and headCertificate match. A chain is
valid if each block’s hash field is the hash of the predecessor block, if the contained values
satisfy the predicate isValidValue, and if each block contains a certificate for the previous
block. This certificate ensures that each block was agreed up by the appropriate committee.
To enable checking the certificate, the public keys of committee members are stored in the
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blockchain. For instance, if the blocks up to level ℓ contain the public keys of the committee
for level ℓ+ k, and the genesis block contains the public keys of the committees for levels 1
to k, then the signatures in a certificate at a given level can be checked by processes that
are not more than k blocks behind.
We emphasize that a process appends to its local blockchain blocks that are not nec-
essarily agreed upon, as agreement is reached only on the block contents and the hash
of the previous block, not on the whole block. Agreement on the whole block is obtained
implicitly at the next level. Therefore, a process considers a block committed if it is not the
head of its blockchain. We also note that an update of p’s blockchain involves only at most
updating the head of the blockchain and not previous blocks. Furthermore, the content of
the head remains unchanged, as this has also been agreed upon.
The DRC solution we presented is generic, one can instantiate it by providing implemen-
tations to initConsensusInstance, runConsensusInstance, betterChain, and stopEventHandler.
We show next how to concretely implement them.
4 A synchronizer for blockchains
We describe a synchronizer for round-based consensus algorithms. Round-based consensus
algorithms progress in rounds, where, at each round, processes attempt to reach a decision,
and if they fail, they advance to the next round to make another attempt.
In the context of round-based consensus algorithms, one standard way to achieve ter-
mination is to ensure that processes remain at the same round for a sufficiently long period
of time [10,5]. The synchronizer we propose realizes this by leveraging the immutability of
the blockchain. One feature of our synchronizer is that it does not exchange any message
thus it does not increase the communication complexity. Instead of exchanging messages,
it relies on rounds having the same duration for all processes. We require that round dura-
tions are increasing and unbounded. Concretely, the duration of a round r > 0 is given by
∆(r), where ∆ is a function with domain N \ {0} such that, for any duration d ∈ N, there
is a round r with ∆(r) ≥ d. Furthermore, we assume that round durations are larger than
the clock skew, so that rounds are not skipped in the synchrony period.
Remark 2. In practice, given estimates δreal of the real message delay and δmax of the max-
imum message delay δ, we would choose ∆ such that: (i) ∆(1) is slightly bigger than δreal,
(ii) ∆ increases rapidly (e.g. exponentially) till it reaches δmax , and (iii) then it increase
slowly (e.g. linearly) afterwards.
To determine at which round the process should be, the synchronizer relies on local
clocks. Therefore, when clocks are synchronized, all processes will be at the same round.
However, a prerequisite is that processes agree on the starting time of the current instance.
As different processes may decide at different rounds, and therefore at different times, there
is a priori no consensus about the start time of an instance. We adopt a solution based on
the following observation: if the round at which a decision is taken is eventually known by
all processes, then they can agree on a common global round at which a consensus instance
is considered to have terminated. Indeed, a process considers that the consensus instance
has ended at the smallest round at which some process has decided.
The above solution can be implemented by firstly considering that a block header stores
the round at which the block is produced, and secondly, by using betterChain(c) to check if
some other process has already taken a decision sooner, in terms of either levels or rounds.
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0 1
.....
ℓp − 2
b (u, h)
r = 2
b′′
(u, h)
r = 3
ℓp − 1
b′
committed blocks
q’s local chain
p’s local chain
Fig. 2: An update of the head of p’s blockchain. Solid boxes represent blocks in p’s
blockchain before the update, while the dashed box represents the block that triggers the
update. Block levels and labels are given above and respectively below the corresponding
boxes. The hash h is that of block b.
Concretely, betterChain(c) checks that the chain c is longer than p’s current blockchain, or
that c has the same length (i.e. ℓp), but c’s head has a smaller round:
25 proc betterChain(c)
26 let 〈ℓ, r, . . . ; ·〉 = head(c)
27 return ℓ ≥ ℓp ∨ (ℓ = ℓp − 1 ∧ r < round(ℓp − 1))
where head(c) returns the head of the chain c and round(ℓ) returns the round contained in
the header of the block at level ℓ in the caller’s blockchain. In the pseudocode, 〈. . . ; . . . 〉
denotes a block, with the part before the semicolon representing the block’s header and
the part after it its contents. We note also that the first disjunct corresponds to the case
where c is longer than p’s blockchain, as c’s length is ℓ+1. When either disjunction holds,
process p is “behind” and thus needs to resynchronize. We come back to this aspect at the
end of the section.
To illustrate the role of betterChain, Fig. 2 shows an update of the head of a process p’s
blockchain. Initially, the head of p’s local chain is b′. Then, p sees the block b′′ at level ℓ
with a smaller round than b′ and therefore updates the head of its local chain to b′′.
Finally, we present the synchronization procedure in Fig. 3. We assume that the genesis
block contains the time t0 of its creation. To synchronize, p uses its local clock, whose
value is obtained by calling now(), and the rounds of the blocks in its blockchain to find
out what its current round and the time position within this round should be. Process p
determines first the starting time of the current level and stores it in t. It then finds the
current round by checking incrementally, starting from round r = 1 whether the round r is
the current round: r is the current round if there is no time left to execute a higher round.
The variable t is updated to represent the time at which round r started. The difference
t′ − t represents the offset between the beginning of the round r and the current time.
Remark 3. If blocks include their creation timestamp, then the sum at line 30 can be more
efficiently computed by adding the timestamp of the head and the duration of the rounds
for the current level. For simplicity, we omit timestamps in blocks.
Fig. 3 also illustrates the timeline of a process that increments its rounds using the
procedure synchronize, where trℓ represents the starting time of the round r of level ℓ and
r′ stands for round(ℓp − 1). The figure also illustrates the offset t
′ − t.
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28 proc synchronize()
29 t′ := now()
30 t := t0 +
∑
ℓp−1
i=0
∑
round(i)
j=1
∆(j)
31 r := 1
32 while t +∆(r) ≤ t′ do
33 t := t+∆(r)
34 r := r + 1
35 return (r, t′ − t)
· · · t1ℓp−1 t
2
ℓp−1
· · · tr
′
ℓp−1
t1ℓp · · · t
r
ℓp
now()
offset∆(1) ∆(r′)
∑r′
j=1
∆(j)
Fig. 3: A round-based synchronizer and a timeline. Small/large vertical lines represent
round/level boundaries, respectively.
Remark 4. When the synchronizer is called is specific to the consensus instance. This should
be done such that processes which are “behind” resynchronize in a timely manner. This
means, in particular, that invoking the synchronizer should not be based only on the
NewMessage and NewChain events: in case the event triggering the synchronization attempt
occurs before τ , the attempt may fail if clocks are not synchronized. One way to ensure that
processes eventually synchronize is for the consensus instance, trigger the synchronization
at regular time intervals.
5 A Single-Shot Consensus Skeleton
In this section we give a generic implementation for the procedure runConsensusInstance
from Section 3.3. Here we make another standard assumption on the structure of the
single-shot consensus algorithm, namely that each round evolves in sequential phases. For
instance, PBFT in normal mode has 3 phases (named pre-prepare, prepare, and commit),
Tendermint as well, DLS and Hotstuff have 4 phases, etc.
We let m denote the number of phases. As for rounds, we assume that each phase
has a predetermined duration. The duration is given by the round r it belongs to, and
it is denoted ∆′(r). For simplicity, we assume that ∆(r) = m · ∆′(r). We also refine the
assumption on round durations, and also require that phase durations are larger than the
clock skew, so that phases are not skipped in the synchrony period, i.e. ∆′(1) > 2ρ.
To synchronize correctly, a process also needs to update its phase (not only its round)
and to know its time position within a phase. These can be readily determined from the
round and the round offset returned by synchronize. The procedure getNextPhase, presented
in Fig. 4, performs this task. For the pseudocode, we consider that each phase has a label
identifying it and we use phases to denote the sequence of phase labels.
The entry point of a single-shot consensus instance is runConsensusInstance, given in
Fig. 4. As part of its state, a process p also maintains its current round rp. A process p
starts by calling synchronize in an attempt to (re)synchronize its round, phase, and position
within the phase with other processes. We recall that this is just an attempt and not a
guarantee because clocks are not necessarily synchronized before τ . If synchronize returns
that p should be at a round in the past with respect to p’s current round, then p invokes
(indirectly) the synchronizer again. This active waiting loop ensures that p is ready to
continue its execution as soon as it not “ahead” anymore; note that a jump backward to
a previous round or phase may jeopardize safety. When p is “behind”, it first uses the
procedure getNextPhase to obtain the phase at which it should be. Next, it updates its
round and the timer used to time the execution of the event handler. Concretely, through
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36 proc runConsensusInstance()
37 (round, roundOffset) = synchronize()
38 if rp > round then # p is ‘‘ahead’’
39 runConsensusInstance()
40 else # p is ‘‘behind’’
41 (phase, phaseOffset) := getNextPhase(round, roundOffset)
42 rp := round
43 set runEventHandler timer to ∆′(rp)− phaseOffset
44 if p ∈ committeeAtLevel(ℓp) then
45 goto phase
46 else
47 goto phase-observer
48 proc getNextPhase(round, roundOffset)
49 i := roundOffset / ∆′(round)
50 phase := phases[i]
51 phaseOffset := roundOffset − i ·∆′(round)
52 return (phase, phaseOffset)
53 proc advance(decisionOption)
54 match decisionOption with
55 | Some (block, blockCertificate) →
56 c := blockchainp ++ block
57 return (c, blockCertificate)
58 | None → # no decision
59 rp := rp + 1
60 filterMessages()
61 runConsensusInstance()
Fig. 4: Entry point and progress procedures for generic single-shot consensus.
this timer, the generic procedure stopEventHandler (used by handleEvents at line 18 in
Fig. 1) is implemented as follows:
62 proc stopEventHandler()
63 return True iff timer runEventHandler expired
Afterwards, p checks whether it is part of the committee for level ℓp. To this end, we assume
having access to a committeeAtLevel function, which returns the committee at some given
level ℓ. This function corresponds to committee(v¯p[..(ℓ − k)]) (Section 3.1), where v¯p is
the sequence of output values of the caller process p. Finally, p executes the single-shot
consensus algorithm according to its role and to the phase returned by getNextPhase. The
determined phase is executed by means of an unconditional jump to corresponding phase
label. The two goto statements in Fig. 4 are intentionally symmetric for committee and
non-committee members to keep all processes in sync. Doing so also for non-committee
members has the advantage of not introducing delays when they eventually become part
of the committee.
Fig. 4 also shows the advance procedure, which is used by processes to handle the
progress of the current consensus instance by either returning the control to runDRC when
a decision can been taken at the current round; or otherwise increasing the round. In
this former case, advance first prepares the updated blockchain, appending the block cor-
responding to the decision to its current blockchain; runDRC will then update the state
accordingly, for instance increasing the level. The procedure advance has one parameter,
which is optional, represented in the pseudocode as a value of an optional type (with values
of the form Somex if the parameter is present or None if it is not). The parameter is present
when the current consensus instance has taken a decision. In this case, the parameter is
a tuple consisting of a block containing the decided value and of a certificate justifying
the decision. Otherwise, when no decision is taken, the process increases its round and fil-
ters its message buffer by removing messages no longer necessary. The filtering procedure
filterMessages is specific to the consensus instance.
We conclude by presenting in Fig. 5 the pseudocode capturing the behavior of the
processes which are not part of a committee for a given level. We call such processes
observers. Contrary to committee members, observers are passive in the sense that they
only receive (but not send) messages and update their state accordingly.
This observer behavior serves two purposes: i) to keep the blockchain at each observer
up to date; ii) to check at the end of the round whether a decision was taken, and if so,
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64 phases[1]-observer phase:
65 handleEvents()
66
.
.
.
67 phases[m− 1]-observer phase:
68 handleEvents()
69 phases[m]-observer phase:
70 handleEvents()
71 advance(getDecision())
Fig. 5: Generic single-shot algorithm for an observer.
whether the observer becomes a committee member at the next level. To achieve i), the
observer checks if it can adopt a proposed value. It does so by invoking the handleEvents
and advance procedures, where the parameter to advance is obtained using the procedure
getDecision, which is specific to the single-shot consensus algorithm. Concerning ii), when
the corresponding check (line 44) is successful, the observer switches roles and acts as a
committee member. We note that line 44 is reached when the observer end its round and
calls advance, which in turn calls runConsensusInstance at the end.
Remark 5. At this point, we anticipate and mention that the pseudocode a committee
member executes has the same structure the code of an observer. In particular, all processes
run advance at the end of the last phase and thus, synchronize (line 37) in a time-based
manner (depending on round duration), as suggested in Remark 4.
As for the DRC solution in Section 3.3, the methods presented in this section are
generic. One can instantiate them by providing implementations to the filterMessages and
getDecision procedures. We show such concrete implementations in the next section.
6 Single-shot Tenderbake
To show the specific phase behavior of a committee member, we first introduce some
terminology inspired by Tezos. Tenderbake committee members are called bakers. At each
round, a value is proposed by the proposer whose turn comes in a round-robin fashion.
Tenderbake has three types of phases: PROPOSE, PREENDORSE, and ENDORSE, each with
a corresponding type of message: Propose for proposals, Preendorse for preendorsements,
and Endorse for endorsements. A fourth type of message, Preendorsements, is for the re-
transmission of preendorsements. A baker proposes, preendorses, and endorses a value v (at
some level and with some round) when the baker broadcasts a message of the corresponding
type. Only one value per round can be proposed or (pre)endorsed. A set of at least 2f +
1 (pre)endorsements with the same level and round and for the same value is called a
(pre)endorsement quorum certificate (QC).
We consider that Propose messages are blocks. This is a design choice that has the
advantage that values do not have to be sent again once decided.
Within a consensus instance, if a baker p receives a preendorsement QC for a value v
and round r, then p keeps track of v as an endorsable value and of r as an endorsable
round. Similarly, if a baker p receives a preendorsement QC for a value v and round r
during the ENDORSE phase of the round r, then p locks on the value v, and it keeps track
of v as a locked value and of r as a locked round. Note that the locked round stores the
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most recent round at which p endorsed a value, while the endorsable round stores the most
recent round that p is aware of at which bakers may have endorsed a value.
In a nutshell, the execution of a round works as follows. During the PROPOSE phase,
the designated proposer proposes a value v, which can be newly generated or an endorsable
value from a previous round r of the same consensus instance. During the PREENDORSE
phase, a baker preendorses v if it is not locked or if it is locked on a value at a previous
round than r; in particular, it does not preendorse v if it is locked and v is newly generated.
If a baker does not preendorse v, then it sends a Preendorsements message with the preen-
dorsement QC that justifies its more recent locked round. During the ENDORSE phase, if
bakers receive a preendorsement QC for v, they lock on it and endorse it. If bakers receive
an endorsement QC for v, they decide v.
Tenderbake inherits from classical BFT solutions the two voting phases per round
and the locking mechanism. Tracking endorsable values is inherited from [4]. Tenderbake
distinguishes itself in a few aspects which we detail next.
Preendorsement QCs. For safety, bakers accept endorsable values only from higher
rounds than their locked round. Assume a correct baker p locks and all other correct bakers
locked at smaller rounds. Assume also that the messages from p are lost. To prevent p from
not making progress, it is enough to include the preendorsement QC that made p lock in
Endorse and Propose messages. In this way, bakers can update their endorsable values and
rounds accordingly and propose values that can be accepted by any correct locked baker.
Note that Tendermint does not need such QCs because it assumes reliable communication
even in the asynchronous period.
The Preendorsements message. To achieve termination faster, when a baker refuses a
proposal because it is locked on a higher round than the endorsable round of the pro-
posed value, it broadcasts a Preendorsements message. This message contains a preendorse-
ment QC justifying its higher locked round. During the next round, bakers use this QC to
set their endorsable value to the one with the highest round. The consensus instance can
then terminate with the first correct proposer. Consequently, in the worst-case scenario,
i.e., when the first f bakers are Byzantine, Tenderbake terminates in f +2 rounds after τ ,
assuming that processes have achieved round synchronization and that the round durations
are sufficiently large.
Endorsement QCs. For processes to be able to check that blocks received by calling
pullChain are already agreed upon, each block comes with an endorsement QC for the
block at the previous level. Furthermore, for the same reason, in response to a pull request,
a process also attaches the endorsement QC that justifies the value in the head of the
blockchain. Recall that a block is a Propose message, which contains a value that has not
yet been decided at the moment the message is sent; thus, the endorsement QCs cannot
justify the current value.
6.1 Process state and initialization
In addition to the variables mentioned in Section 3.3, a process p running Tenderbake
maintains its current round rp as well as:
– lockedValuep and lockedRoundp to keep track respectively of the value on which p is
locked and the round during which p locked on it,
– endorsableValuep to keep track of the proposed value with a preendorsement QC (with
the highest round), which can therefore be considered endorsable,
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– endorsableRoundp and preendorsementQCp to store the round and the preendorsement
QC corresponding to an endorsable value.
The variables endorsableValuep and endorsableRoundp can be recovered from the vari-
able preendorsementQCp. We only use them for readability. The variable headCertificatep
from Section 3.3 stores the endorsement QC for p’s last decided value.
The state of a process is initialized by the procedure initConsensusInstance:
72 proc initConsensusInstance()
73 rp := 1
74 lockedValuep := ⊥; lockedRoundp := 0
75 endorsableValuep := ⊥; endorsableRoundp := 0
76 preendorsementQCp := ∅
where, by abuse of notation, we use x := ⊥ to denote that x has become undefined.
6.2 Messages and blocks
We write messages using the following syntax: typep(ℓ, r, h, payload), where type is Propose,
Preendorse, Endorse, or Preendorsements, p is the process that sent the message, ℓ and r are
the level and the round during which the message is generated, h is the hash the block at
level ℓ − 1, and payload is the type specific content of the message. Next, we describe the
payloads for each type of message.
The payload (eQC , u, eR, pQC ) of a Propose message contains the endorsement quo-
rum eQC that justifies the block at the previous level and the proposed value u to be agreed
on. The payload also contains, in case u is a previously proposed value, the corresponding
endorsable round and the preendorsement QC that justifies u. If the proposed value is new,
then eR is 0 and pQC is the empty set.
Given a Propose(ℓ, r, h, (eQC , u, eR, pQC)) message, the corresponding block has con-
tents u, while the remaining fields are part of the block header. We emphasize that the
distinction between a propose message and a block is only made for presentation purposes,
to separate concerns.
The payload of a Preendorse message consists of the value to be agreed upon. The
payload of an Endorse message consists of an endorsed value to and its preendorsement
QC. The payload of a Preendorsements message consists of a preendorsement QC justifying
some endorsable value and round.
6.3 Message management
Tenderbake messages are handled by the procedure handleConsensusMessage depicted in
Fig. 6. Upon the retrieval of a new message msg, a process p first checks if the level,
round, and hash in msg’s header match respectively p’s current level, either the cur-
rent round or the next round, and the hash of the block at the previous level. If yes,
p then checks that the message is valid, with the procedure isValidMessage, detailed be-
low. If msg is indeed valid, then it is stored in the message buffer. Also, the variables
endorsableValuep, endorsableRoundp, and preendorsementQCp are updated by the proce-
dure updateEndorsable if a preendorsement QC is observed for a higher round than the
current endorsableRoundp. This can happen if there is already a preendorsement QC for
the current proposed value in messages or if a preendorsement QC for a higher round
than the current endorsableRoundp is attached to a Propose, Endorse, or Preendorsements
message (line 92). Finally, if the received message is from a higher level, then p attempts
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to resynchronize by calling pullChain. This is an optimization as the pullChain is anyway
called regularly as described in Section 3.3.
The procedure isValidMessage checks the validity of each message. Proposeq(ℓ,r,h,(eQC ,
u,eR,pQC )) is valid if q is the proposer for level ℓ and round r and if eQC is an endorsement
QC for level ℓ − 1 with the round, hash, and value matching those in p’s blockchain. In
addition, either pQC is empty and eR is 0 (i.e. u is newly proposed), or the round, value,
and hash from pQC match eR, u, and hp, respectively. Messages in eQC and pQC must
be valid themselves, in particular they must be generated by bakers at levels ℓ − 1 and ℓ,
respectively. These validity checks ensure that the value (u, h) satisfies the isLegitimateValue
predicate from Section 3.1. The validity conditions for the other types of messages are
similar, and thus omitted. We note, however, that for preendorsements and endorsements
it is required that the corresponding proposal has been already received, so that it can be
checked that the hash included in the payload matches the proposed value.
We highlight two additional aspects of handleConsensusMessage:
– messages for the next round are kept (line 81) to cater for the possible clock drift;
– messages from higher levels trigger p to ask for the sender’s blockchain (line 84), because
such messages “from the future” suggest that p is behind; however, the sender might
be lying about being ahead.
Recall that the procedure advance only calls filterMessages() after a round increment.
In the case of Tenderbake, this procedure removes messages not for the current round
(line 104), thus ensuring that message buffers are bounded.
For completeness, the helper procedures used in Fig. 6 are described as follows:
– proposedValue() returns the current proposed value. of the block at level ℓ.
– valueQC(qc) and roundQC(qc) return the value and the round from qc respectively.
– proposal(), preendorsements(), and endorsements() return the proposal, preendorsements,
and respectively the endorsements contained in messages.
6.4 Tenderbake main loop
The execution of one round of Tenderbake by baker p, when the round’s three phases
are executed in sequence, is given in Fig. 6. We recall that the pseudocode has the same
structure as that for observers, as described in Section 5. Recall also from Section 5 that
forward jumps can nevertheless occur when p detects it is behind.
Each phase consists of a conditional broadcast followed by a call to handleEvents (de-
scribed in Section 3.3). In addition, the ENDORSE phase calls advance (described in Sec-
tion 3.3). Next, we describe the conditions to broadcast in each phase.
In the PROPOSE phase, p checks if it is the proposer for the current level ℓp and
round rp (line 106). If so, p proposes:
– either a new value u, returned by the procedure newValue; here it is assumed that u is
consistent with respect to the value u′ contained in the last block of the blockchain of the
process that calls this procedure; that is, isConsistentValue(v, v′) holds (see Section 3.1),
where v, v′ are the output values corresponding to u, u′;
– or its endorsableValuep if defined; in this case, p includes in the payload of its proposal
the corresponding endorsable round and the preendorsement QC that justifies it.
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77 proc handleConsensusMessage(msg)
78 let typeq(ℓ, r, h, payload) = msg
79 if ℓ = ℓp ∧ h = hp ∧ (r = rp ∨ r = rp + 1) then
80 if isValidMessage(msg)
81 messagesp := messagesp ∪ {msg}
82 updateEndorsable()
83 else if ℓ > ℓp then
84 pullChain
85 proc updateEndorsable(msg)
86 if |preendorsements()| ≥ 2f + 1 then
87 endorsableValuep := proposedValue()
88 endorsableRoundp := rp
89 preendorsementQCp := preendorsements()
90 else if type(msg) 6= Preendorse then
91 (eR, eV , pQC) := endorsableVars(msg)
92 if eR > endorsableRoundp then
93 endorsableValuep := eV
94 endorsableRoundp := eR
95 preendorsementQCp := pQC
96 proc endorsableVars(msg)
97 let pQC = match msg with
98 | Proposep(ℓp, rp, hp, (eQC , hu, eR, pQC)) → pQC
99 | Endorse(ℓp, rp, hp, (hu, pQC)) → pQC
100 | Preendorsements(ℓp, rp, hp, pQC) → pQC
101 return (roundQC(pQC), valueQC(pQC), pQC)
102 proc filterMessages()
103 messagesp := messagesp\
104 {type(ℓ, r, h,payload) ∈ messagesp | r 6= rp}
105 PROPOSE phase:
106 if proposer(ℓp, rp) = p then
107 u := if endorsableValuep 6= ⊥ then endorsableValuep
108 else newValue()
109 payload := (headCertificatep, u,
110 endorsableRoundp, preendorsementQCp)
111 broadcast Proposep(ℓp, rp, hp, payload)
112 handleEvents()
113 PREENDORSE phase:
114 if ∃q, eQC, u, eR, pQC :
115 Proposeq(ℓp, rp, hp, (eQC, u, eR, pQC)) ∈ messagesp ∧
116 (lockedValuep = u ∨ lockedRoundp ≤ eR < rp) then
117 broadcast Preendorsep(ℓp, rp, hp, hash(u))
118 else if lockedValuep 6= ⊥ then
119 broadcast Preendorsements(ℓp, rp, hp,
120 preendorsementQCp)
121 handleEvents()
122 ENDORSE phase:
123 if |preendorsements()| ≥ 2f + 1 then
124 u := proposedValue()
125 lockedValuep := u; lockedRoundp := rp
126 broadcast Endorsep(ℓp, rp, hp,
127 (hash(u), preendorsementQCp))
128 handleEvents()
129 advance(getDecision())
Fig. 6: Single-shot Tenderbake for baker p (right) and message management (left).
The payload also includes the endorsement QC to justify the decision for the previous level.
In the PREENDORSE phase, p checks if the value u from the Propose message received
from the current proposer is preendorsable (lines 115-116). Namely, it checks whether one
of the following conditions are satisfied:
– p is unlocked (lockedRound = 0, and thus the second disjunct at line 116 holds); or
– p is locked (i.e. lockedRound > 0), u was already proposed during some previous round
(i.e. 0 < eR < rp), and:
• p is already locked on u itself; or
• p is locked on u′ 6= u and its locked round is smaller or equal than the endorsable
round associated to u.
In the second case, we know there is a preendorsement QC for u and round eR, thanks to
the validity check on the Propose message. If the condition holds, then p preendorses u.
If p cannot preendorse u because it is locked on some value u′ 6= u with a higher locked
round than eR, then p broadcasts the preendorsement QC that justifies v′. If received on
time, this information allows the next correct proposer to propose a value that passes the
above checks for all correct bakers.
In the ENDORSE phase, p checks if it received a preendorsement QC for the proposed
value u. If yes, p updates its lockedValue and endorsableValue and broadcasts its Endorse
message, along with all the Preendorse messages for u (lines 123-127). Note also that in
this case p has already updated its endorsable value to u and its endorsable round to rp
while executing handleEvents.
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Finally, at the end of this last phase, which is also the end of the round, bakers call
advance with a parameter that signals whether a decision can be taken or not. This pa-
rameter is obtained using getDecision, implemented is as follows:
130 proc getDecision()
131 if |endorsements()| ≥ 2f + 1 then
132 return Some (proposal(), endorsements())
133 else
134 return None
7 Correctness and complexity
The following theorem states that Tenderbake provides a solution to DRC. Its proof can
be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 1. Tenderbake satisfies validity, agreement, and termination.
7.1 Bounded memory.
We assume that all values referred to by global or local variables of a process p are stored
in volatile memory, except for the variable blockchainp whose value is stored on disk.
The following lemma shows that a process can use fixed-sized buffers, namely of size 4n.
We recall that the message buffer is represented by the messagesp variable.
Lemma 1. For any correct process p, at any time, |messagesp| ≤ 4n.
Proof. Let p be some correct process. Given that in messagesp only messages from the
current and next round are added (line 81), and that with each new round messages from the
previous round are filtered out (line 104), messagesp contains at most 2n preendorsements
and and at most 2n endorsements. ⊓⊔
The following result states that a process only uses bounded memory.
Theorem 2. At any time, the size of the volatile memory of any correct process is in O(n2).
Proof. A correct process maintains a constant number of variables, and each variable dif-
ferent from messages either stores a primitive value or a QC. A QC contains at most n
messages and each message has either a constant size or its size is in O(n). In particular,
an endorsement contains a preendorsement QC. However, a preendorsement has constant
size. The O(n2) bound follows from these observations, and the observation concerning the
messages variable from the proof of Lemma 1. ⊓⊔
7.2 Message and Round Complexity.
Each round has a message complexity of O(nm) due to the n-to-m broadcast, where m is
the current number of processes in the system.
Concerning round complexity, it is known that consensus, in the worst case scenario,
cannot be reached in less than f + 1 rounds [11]. In Tenderbake, after bakers synchronize
and the round durations are sufficiently long (namely, at least δ + 2ρ), a decision is taken
in at most f + 2 rounds, as already mentioned in Section 6. See Lemma 10 in Section B
for a proof. Intuitively, f rounds are needed in case the proposers of these rounds are
Byzantine. Another round is needed if there is a correct process locked on a higher round
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than the endorsable round of the proposed value. However, in this case, the next proposer
is correct and will have updated its endorsable round, and therefore its proposed value will
be accepted and decided by all correct processes.
The number of rounds necessary for the round duration to become larger than δ depends
on ∆’s growth. For instance, if∆ grows exponentially, then this number is in O(log(δ+2ρ)).
(This point is related to the recommendation for the choice of∆ in Remark 2, see item (ii).)
Remark 6. The space required by a QC may be reduced by using threshold signatures
which has the effect of reducing the message size from O(n) to O(1). Note however that this
technique requires threshold keys to be generated a priori, for example using a distributed
key generation algorithm.
Since knowledge of the committee participants and their public keys is known a priori,
it is possible to use aggregated signatures formed by signing with standard keys, along
with a bitfield which represents the presence or absence of a participant’s signature. Then
aggregated signatures can be used instead of threshold signatures with similar effect besides
the extra space required for the bitfield.
The use of threshold signatures can be combined with a restructuring of the communi-
cation pattern within a round to also reduce the message complexity, as done for instance
in HotStuff [26]: processes send their (pre)endorsements to the proposer, who combines the
received signature shares into one threshold signature.
7.3 Recovery time
We analyze the time that processes need in order to recover from the asynchronous period,
that is, the time to synchronize with each other after τ and start a new round synchronized.
For simplicity, in this analysis, we assume that there is no clock drift after τ , that
is ρ = 0. We say that two correct processes are synchronized if they are at the same level,
round, and phase. Let τrt > τ be the time of the beginning of the first round at which all
correct processes are synchronized (already at the beginning of that round). We define the
recovery time ∆rt as τrt − τ .
To give an upper bound on ∆rt , we first introduce some notation. Let ∆err be the
bound on the clock error that can occur before τ , i.e. the maximum value of |t − now()|,
over all real clock values t < τ , where now is called at t. Let ∆pull(l) be the maximum
delay between an invocation of pullChain after τ and the reception of the new chain, where
l is the number of received blocks. In other words, ∆pull(l) is the maximum time that a
process needs to fetch l missing blocks. Note that this is at least one round-trip time: the
time to ask for the current blockchain and to get the reply. We also define ℓτ to be the
maximal level at which a correct process can be at τ . Let t1ℓτ+1 be the end time of the first
round at which the decision for the block at level ℓτ has been taken. Note that this is also
the start time of the first round at level ℓτ + 1. Lastly, we let ∆inv be the function that,
given a time difference td, returns the round at which a process would be at time t had it
started its consensus instance td time ago. Formally, ∆inv(td) = r iff td ∈ [sr, sr+1), where
s1 = 0 and sr =
∑r−1
i=1 ∆(i) for r > 1.
The upper bound on the recovery time depends on (a) ∆err, (b) the time interval I
at which processes call the pullChain primitive; (c) the time a process needs to fetch the
missing blocks, which, in the worst case, when at τ the slowest process is still at the genesis
block, is ∆pull(ℓτ ), and (d) the round duration function ∆.
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Theorem 3. The recovery time ∆rt is upper bounded by
max (∆err, I +∆pull(ℓτ ) +∆(r), ∆(r
′) +∆(r′ + 1)) ,
where r = ∆inv(τ + I +∆pull(ℓτ )− t
1
ℓτ+1
) and r′ = ∆inv(τ − t
1
ℓτ+1
).
The terms ∆(r) and ∆(r′ + 1) express that a process may need, even after being
synchronized, to further wait until a new round begins. We note that the presence of these
terms justifies the recommendation for the choice of ∆ in Remark 2, point (iii): minimizing
the round durations also minimizes ∆rt.
While we can control the interval I and the round duration function ∆, the other two
variables (namely ∆err and ℓτ ) are exogenous and thus cannot be controlled. However, we
believe that in practice the time to pull a new chain (and even to pull just the last block)
is considerably bigger than the maximum error clock that a process can experience during
the asynchronous period.
Proof. We call cpp = 〈ℓp, rp〉 the computation position of a process p. We define the
correct computation position cp∗ as the level and round that any correct process would be
at, if it had the current longest valid chain c and access to a synchronized clock. That is,
cp∗ = 〈level∗, round∗〉, where level∗ is the length of c and round∗ is computed by synchronize
when called over c and when now() returns the real time.
The distinguish the following cases in which a correct process p can be at time τ :
(A) p is at a lower level than cp∗, i.e. ℓp < level
∗;
(B) p is at the same level as cp∗, but at a smaller or equal round, i.e. ℓp = level
∗ and
rp ≤ round
∗; and,
(C) p is at the same level as cp∗, but at a greater round, i.e. ℓp = level
∗ and rp > round
∗.
Note that, as we consider cp∗ at τ , we have level∗ = ℓτ + 1.
Case (A). We assume the worst case, namely, that at time τ the local blockchain of p
contains only the genesis block. Recall that process p is calling pullChain every I time units.
We assume that before τ all messages to and from p are lost and that p calls pullChain at
time τ − ǫ, for some ǫ > 0, without being able to update its local blockchain. When p calls
pullChain at time τ − ǫ + I this operation succeeds. Thus, at time τ − ǫ + I + ∆pull(ℓτ )
the local blockchain of p is updated up to level ℓτ , and at the subsequent invocation
of synchronize(), also at time τ − ǫ + I + ∆pull(ℓτ ), process p finally gets to the correct
computation position cp∗. Let rp and offsetp be the values returned by synchronize(). If
offsetp 6= 0, p is not at the very beginning of the round, thus it must wait one more round to
reach τrt. That is, p has to wait∆(rp) further. Thus, in this scenario, p reaches the beginning
of the round with the correct computation position at most at time τ+I+∆pull(ℓτ )+∆(rp).
Note that rp = ∆inv(τ + I +∆pull(ℓτ )− t
1
ℓτ+1
).
Case (B). Since, at time τ , cpp is behind cp
∗, then as soon as p calls synchronize() after τ ,
in the worst case at time τ − ǫ′ + ∆(rp), for some ǫ
′ > 0, then it reaches cp∗. Here
rp = ∆inv(τ−t
1
ℓτ+1
). However, pmay reach cp∗ in the middle of a round, therefore p reaches
the beginning of the first round after the synchronization (with the correct computation
position) at the latest at time τ +∆(rp) +∆(rp + 1).
Case (C). Finally, if p’s computation position cpp is in advance with respect to cp
∗ then
p has to wait for at most the maximum clock error ∆err to get to cp
∗. Note that in this
case, it reaches cp∗ at the very beginning of the round round∗.
To conclude, it suffices to note that ∆rt is upper bounded by the maximum between
the terms in the above cases. ⊓⊔
20 L. As,tefănoaei, P. Chambart, A. Del Pozzo, T. Rieutord, E. Tate, S. Tucci, E. Zălinescu
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a formalization of dynamic repeated consensus, a general ap-
proach to solve it, and a BFT solution working with bounded buffers by leveraging a
blockchain-based synchronizer.
As future work, we see several exciting directions: experimentally evaluate the provided
solution; explore the relationship between achieving asynchronous responsiveness and pro-
viding bounded buffers; improve message size and complexity by means of aggregated or
threshold signatures; mechanize the proofs; and analyze Tenderbake from an economic
perspective when considering rational agents.
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A Relation between DRC and SMR
SMR is defined in terms of agreement and order properties where processes are separated
in clients (issuing requests), and state machine replicas (serving client requests). The two
properties are stated as follows [23]:
(SMR agreement). Every non-faulty state machine replica receives every request sent by
a correct client.
(SMR order). Every non-faulty state machine replica processes the requests it receives in
the same relative order.
Let us note that by solving DRC, SMR order is straightforwardly guaranteed, thanks
to the DRC agreement property.
On the other hand, to solve SMR agreement, client requests must be reliably diffused
to non-faulty replicas. The only caveat here is that DRC does not impose any constraint
on the membership in the replica set running consensus instances: the set of replicas is not
a priori-known and can vary over time.
To study the relation between SMR and DRC in dynamic models admitted by DRC,
let us denote the infinite sequence of consensus instances as C = {C1, C2, . . . Cm . . .}, in
which each instance Ci is associated to a committee of replicas and assume that a client p
can (repeatedly) send the request to committee replica processes upon fair-lossy channels:
if p sends the request infinitely often to a correct receiver q, then q will eventually receive
the request. We further reformulate the SMR agreement property for dynamic committees
as follows:
(SMR agreement for dynamic committees). For every pending request sent by a
correct client, there exists a consensus instance Ci ∈ C, such that the request is the input
value of every correct replica in Ci.
It is easy to observe that if the membership were static across committees, a client
request will eventually belong to the input value of each correct replica for some consensus
instance – if the request has not been served before. Since the membership does not change,
the request (while pending) is in the input value of subsequent consensus instances.
For dynamic committees, we will refer in the following to two models defined in [16],
namely the MN and the M arrival models, to consider an unbounded number of process
replicas. We will observe that SMR agreement for dynamic committees is solvable in the
former model and unsolvable in the latter.
Dynamic committees in the MN arrival model. Let us recall that MN means that the
number of processes running inside the system is bounded in each run to N , but may be
unbounded when we consider the union of all the runs3. It is easy to show that in the
3 The bound may vary from one run to another. It follows that no protocol can rely on such a
bound, as a protocol does not know in advance the particular run that will be produced.
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MN arrival model (with N > n), it is possible to satisfy SMR agreement for dynamic
committees.
Indeed, a simple solution satisfying SMR agreement consists in letting a client p contact
committees through the use of the pullChain primitive and committee function. The client
p calls pullChain repeatedly to receive decided output values; these are given as input to
the committee function to know about elected committees. In this way p will know about
an ever growing prefix of C, and it can send repeatedly its request to all replica processes
belonging to the prefix.
We note that in each run, the selection function will elect over time a finite set of correct
processes S ∈ Π infinitely often, not necessarily belonging to the same committees all the
time. As soon as a client p, possibly never elected in any committee in such run, will know
about a process q in this set S, it will start to re-transmit the pending request to q. Note
that the cardinality of S is greater or equal than 2f + 1 but always bounded in any run.
Once the bound is reached, after some time the request will reach the whole set S. When
the last member of S receives the request, then there exists a consensus instance Ci ⊆ S
that will have the request as input value at any correct replica, if the request has not been
served before.
Dynamic membership in the M arrival model. In this model the number of processes that
join the system in a single run may grow to infinity as the time passes, but it is finite in
any time interval. In this model it is not possible to satisfy SMR agreement for dynamic
committees.
The key point is that in this model a finite set S of infinitely elected replicas might
not exist. In this model any process might be elected only a finite number of times, still
the sequence C is infinite by replacing old processes with newly joining ones. Thus, if
any committee is eventually replaced by committee members never elected before (thus
not known by p), the client pending request can never reach the correct replicas of any
consensus instance. One possible scenario generating a run in this model is as follows: the
request arrived at all the processes in the prefix till Ci at the very end of the consensus
instance. The next committee Ci+1 is composed by at least f + 1 processes never elected
before, i.e., by at least one new correct process not previously known by p. Even assuming
that p will know about Ci+1 as soon as the output value oi+1 is produced, if the request
is still pending, the same scenario can repeat for the next committee, and then repeat for
any committee Cj ∈ C, with j > i.
B Correctness proof
In this section we prove the correctness of Tenderbake. The proofs for the agreement and
validity properties are inspired by [3].
B.1 Validity and Agreement
Theorem 4. Tenderbake satisfies validity.
Proof. A correct process p filters out invalid messages (line 80). In particular, it filters
out a propose message containing a value u and a hash h that do not satisfy the predi-
cate isValidValue. Therefore it cannot decide on tuples (u, h) that do not satisfy this pred-
icate. ⊓⊔
Lemma 2. Correct bakers only preendorse and endorse once per round at a given level.
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Proof. Preendorse and Endorse messages are sent only at line 117 and line 127, respectively.
Furthermore, a phase is executed only once for a given round. Indeed, phases are executed
sequentially: PROPOSE, then PREENDORSE, then ENDORSE, and then a new round begins
with the call to advance (129). At this point (line 61), a potentially non-sequential jump to
a different phase (line 45) takes place. However, due to the check on line 38, this jump is
always a forward jump. Therefore a phase is never executed twice for the same round. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3. At most one value can have a (pre)endorsement QC per round.
Proof. We reason by contradiction. Let v and v′ be two different values. If both v and
v′ have a (pre)endorsement QC then by quorum intersection at least 1 correct process
(pre)endorses both v and v′, which contradicts Lemma 2. ⊓⊔
We say a baker p is locked on a tuple (u, h) if lockedValuep = u and hp = h. We de-
fine Lu,hℓ,r as the set of correct bakers locked on the tuple (u, h) at level ℓ and at the end
of round r. We also define preendos(ℓ, r, u, h) as the set of preendorsements generated by
correct processes for some level ℓ, some round r, some value u, and some hash h. Note that
this set may be empty. Note also that if there is a preendorsement QC for (ℓ, r, u, h), then
|preendos(ℓ, r, u, h)| ≥ f+1. This is because a preendorsement QC contains at most f preen-
dorsements generated by Byzantine processes. And vice-versa, if |preendos(ℓ, r, u, h)| ≤ f ,
then there cannot be a preendorsement QC for (ℓ, r, u, h).
Lemma 4. Let ℓ be a level, r a round, u a value, and h a block hash. For any round r′ ≥ r
and any tuple (u′, h′) 6= (u, h), if |Lu,hℓ,r | ≥ f + 1, then |preendosp(ℓ, r
′, u′, h′)| ≤ f .
Proof. We reason by contradiction. Suppose that |Lu,hℓ,r | ≥ f+1, and let r
′ ≥ r be the small-
est round for which there exists a tuple (u′, h′) 6= (u, h) such that |preendos(ℓ, r′, u′, h′)| ≥
f + 1. As |Lu,hℓ,r | ≥ f + 1 and |preendos(ℓ, r
′, u′, h′)| ≥ f + 1, there is at least one correct
process p such that p ∈ Lu,hℓ,r and p preendorsed (u
′, h′) at round r′. As p ∈ Lu,hℓ,r , we have
that p is locked on (u, h) at round r. Since p preendorsed (line 117) at round r′, it means
that one of the two disjunctions at line 116 holds. Note that the value of rp at line 116 is
r′ in this case.
Suppose the first disjunction holds, i.e., lockedValuep = u
′. As a process can re-lock
only in the phase ENDORSE, under the condition at line 123, this means that there is
a round r′′ with r ≤ r′′ < r′ and at which |preendorsements()| ≥ 2f + 1. Therefore
|preendos(ℓ, r′′, u′, h′)| ≥ f + 1. This contradicts the minimality of r′.
Suppose now that the second disjunction holds, that is, lockedRoundp ≤ r
′′ < r′ where
the round r′′ is the endorsable round of the proposer of u′. It is easy to see that a process
cannot unlock (i.e. unset lockedRound), but only re-lock (i.e. set lockedRound to a different
value). Therefore lockedRoundp ≥ r at round r
′ and from this, we obtain that r′′ ≥ r >
0. From the validity requirements of a propose message, we obtain that it contains a
preendorsement QC for (u′, h′). Thus we have that |preendos(ℓ, r′′, u′, h′)| ≥ f + 1. This
contradicts the minimality of r′, since r′′ < r′.
As we have obtained a contradiction in both cases, the lemma holds. ⊓⊔
Lemma 5. No two correct processes have two different committed blocks at the same level
in their blockchain.
Proof. We reason by contradiction. Let ℓ be some level. Assume that two different correct
processes p, p′ have respectively two different committed blocks b, b′ at level ℓ in their
blockchain, with b 6= b′.
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By the definition of committed blocks (Section 6.1), as b is a committed block at ℓ, the
level of the head of p’s blockchain is at least ℓ+ 1. Then, as p has a block at level ℓ+ 1 in
his blockchain, p has observed an endorsement QC for (ℓ+ 1, r, h, u) for some value u and
some round r, where h is the hash of block b. Similarly, p′ has observed an endorsement QC
for (ℓ + 1, r′, h′, u′) for some value u′ and some round r′, where h′ is the hash of block b′.
As b 6= b′, we have that h 6= h′, therefore (u, h) 6= (u′, h′). We assume without loss of
generality that r ≤ r′.
Since there are at most f Byzantine processes, and by Lemma 2 correct bakers can only
endorse once per round, it follows that at least f +1 correct bakers endorsed (u, h) during
round r at level ℓ. Before broadcasting an endorsement for (u, h) at round r (line 127) any
correct process sets its lockedValue to u and its lockedRound to r (line 125), thus |Lu,hℓ,r | ≥
f +1. By Lemma 4, since |Lu,hℓ,r | ≥ f +1, we also have |preendos(ℓ, r
′′, u′′, h′′)| ≤ f , for any
round r′′ ≥ r, and any value u′′ with (u′′, h′′) 6= (u, h). This means that a correct process
cannot endorse some (u′′, h′′) 6= (u, h) at a round r′′ ≥ r. This in turn means that there
cannot be 2f + 1 endorsements for (u′′, h′′) 6= (u, h) with round r′′ ≥ r. This contradicts
the fact that there is a QC for (ℓ + 1, r′, u′, h′). ⊓⊔
Theorem 5. Tenderbake satisfies agreement.
Proof. We reason by contradiction. Suppose there are two correct processes p and p′ with
outputs v¯ and v¯′ such that neither one is the prefix of the other. This means that there is a
level ℓ such that v¯[ℓ] 6= v¯′[ℓ]. We have that processes p and p′ have two different committed
blocks at level ℓ, which contradicts Lemma 5. ⊓⊔
B.2 Termination
Let Phases be the set of labels PROPOSE, PREENDORSE, and ENDORSE. Let Sp : N
∗ ×
N
∗ × Phases → R be the function such that Sp(ℓ, r, phase) gives the starting time of the
phase phase of round r of process p at level ℓ. We consider that the function Sp returns
the real time, not the local time of process p. Note that for different processes p and q,
the function Sp and Sq may return different times for the same input, because p and q
determine the starting time of their phases based on their local clocks, which may be
different before τ .
Contrary to Section 7.3, we consider the general case when ρ ≥ 0. We say that two
correct processes p and p′ are synchronized if ℓp = ℓp′ , |rp−rp′ | ≤ 1, and |Sp(ℓq, rq, phaseq)−
Sp′(ℓq, rq, phaseq)| ≤ 2ρ, where q ∈ {p, p
′} is the process which is “ahead”. We say that q
is ahead of q′ (or that q′ is behind q) if Sq(ℓq, rq, phaseq) ≤ Sq′(ℓq, rq, phaseq). Intuitively,
two processes are synchronized if they are roughly at the same level, round, and phase,
where by “roughly” we understand that the process that is behind starts its current phase
at most 2ρ time after the process that is ahead starts the same phase (at the same level
and round). We say that p and q are synchronized at level ℓ and round r if p and q are
synchronized and ℓ = ℓp = ℓq and r = max(rp, rq). Note that at the beginning of the
round r of one of the processes, the other process might be at round r− 1. However, for at
least ∆′(r) − 2ρ time, the two processes are at the same round r.
Next, we provide a simpler characterization of process synchronization. Let t be the last
time p called getNextPhase. We denote by levelOffsetp = now− levelStart, where now is the
value returned by now when called by p at t, and levelStart = t0 +
∑ℓp−1
i=0
∑round(i)
j=1 ∆(j).
Note that every call to getNextPhase is preceded by a call to synchronize, which in turn
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calls now. The next lemma states that we can use level offsets to characterize process
synchronization. We omit its proof, which follows from an analysis of the synchronize and
getNextPhase functions.
Lemma 6. After τ , two correct processes p and q are synchronized iff |levelOffsetp −
levelOffsetq| ≤ 2ρ.
Lemma 7. Let p and q be two correct processes. If, after τ , they remain at the same level
and the head of their blockchain has the same round, then they are eventually synchronized.
Proof. Suppose that p and q are both at the same level ℓ and the head of their blockchain
has the same round. Note that the head of their blockchain is at level ℓ− 1. Furthermore,
p and q have already decided at ℓ− 1. From the agreement property, p and q agree on the
output value at level ℓ−1, which means that they agree on all blocks up to (and including)
level ℓ − 2, and therefore on their rounds as well. Thus, the block rounds in p’s and q’s
blockchain are respectively the same.
Next, we observe that both p and q eventually call synchronize and getNextPhase. Indeed,
at the end of a round a correct process calls advance, which in turn calls runConsensusInstance
and finally synchronize. A round eventually terminates, because it has a fixed duration.
Also, the round returned by synchronize will eventually be larger than the current round
of the process, so the process will eventually exit the recursion at line 39 and also call
getNextPhase.
Let p be the first to call getNextPhase and let t be the time of the call. Let t′ ≥ t be
the time when q first calls getNextPhase.
We first note that levelStart in the definition of levelOffset is the same for both p
and q, at both times t and t′. Let levelOffset∗t = t − levelStart and levelOffset
∗
t′ = t
′ −
levelStart. Intuitively, these are the correct level offsets at t and t′ of any correct process
if its local clocks were precise. We consider the values of the variable levelOffsetp at t
and t′ and denote these by (simply) levelOffsetp and levelOffset
′
p, respectively. We note that
levelOffset ′p − levelOffsetp = t
′ − t, because we assume that a process measures intervals of
time precisely. Given the bound on clock skews, we have that |levelOffsetp−levelOffset
∗
t | ≤ ρ
and |levelOffsetq − levelOffset
∗
t′ | ≤ ρ. Summing up, by using the inequality |a − b| ≤
|a|+ |b|, we obtain that |levelOffsetq − levelOffsetp − (t
′ − t)| ≤ 2ρ, that is, |levelOffsetq −
levelOffset ′p| ≤ 2ρ. Then, by Lemma 6, p and q are synchronized at t
′. ⊓⊔
Lemma 8. If P is a set of correct processes that are synchronized after τ at a level and
a round r with ∆′(r) > δ + 2ρ, and a process p ∈ P sends a message at the beginning of
its current phase ph, then this message is received by all processes in P by the end of their
phase ph.
Proof. Assume that p sends its message at time tp = Sp(ℓ, r, ph). Consider a process q ∈ P ,
and let tq = Sq(ℓ, r, ph). Process q receives the message at most at time tp + δ. By the
synchronization hypothesis, we have that tp − tq ≤ 2ρ. Then we obtain that tp + δ ≤
tq + 2ρ+ δ < tq +∆
′(r). Note that tq +∆
′(r) is the time of the end of the phase ph for q.
Note also that if tp < tq, q might receive the message while it is still at round r − 1. Even
so, this message is available to q at round r because correct processes keep messages from
a round one unit higher than their current round. ⊓⊔
Lemma 9. Let ℓ be a level and r a round with ∆′(r) > δ + 2ρ. Consider that all correct
bakers are synchronized at level ℓ and round r at a time after τ . Let p be the proposer at
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round r. If p is correct and endorsableRoundp ≥ lockedRoundq for any correct baker q,
then all correct bakers decide at level ℓ at the end of round r.
Proof. From Lemma 8, we obtain that the Propose message of process p is received by all
correct bakers by the beginning of their phase PREENDORSE. We prove next that each
correct baker sends the message Preendorse(ℓ, r, h, u), where u, h are the value and the
predecessor hash proposed by p. Let q be some correct baker. If q is either unlocked or
locked on u, then the condition in line 116 holds, and therefore q sends its preendorse-
ment for (u, h). Suppose now that q is locked on a value different from u. By hypothesis,
we have lockedRoundq ≤ endorsableRoundp. Also, we have that endorsableRoundp < r,
since endorsableRoundp is set during the execution of handleEvents before sending the
Propose message in round r, therefore it is set at a previous round. We thus have that
lockedRoundq ≤ endorsableRoundp < r and therefore the condition in line 116 holds for q
(note that r = rp = rq). Thus q sends the corresponding Preendorse message. So, we have
proved that all correct bakers broadcast the Preendorse(ℓ, r, h, u) message (line 117).
By Lemma 8 again, all these (at least 2f+1) Preendorse(ℓ, r, h, u) messages are received
by all correct bakers by the beginning of the phase ENDORSE. If follows that, for all correct
bakers, the condition in line 123 is true and thus all correct bakers broadcast the Endorse
message for (u, h) (line 127). In the next phase (namely the phase PROPOSE) the quorum
condition (line 132) holds for (u, h), for all correct bakers, so all of them decide (u, h). ⊓⊔
Lemma 10. If at some time after τ all correct bakers are synchronized at some level ℓ
and round r with ∆′(r) > δ + 2ρ, then all correct bakers decide at level ℓ by the end of
round r + f + 1.
Proof. We first remark that, after τ , a correct baker never skips a round, and in particular
never skips its turn when it is time to propose. Indeed, when a baker calls again synchronize
and getNextPhase to resynchronize at the end of a round, its local clock can be in advance
with respect to the previous reading of its local clock by at most 2ρ. As we assumed that
2ρ < ∆′(1), the baker would still have remaining time to execute the PROPOSE phase of
the next round.
Let p0, p1, . . . be the sequence of bakers in the order in which they propose starting
with round r. That is, pi is the proposer at round r + i, for i ≥ 0. Let j, k be the indexes
of the first and second correct bakers in this sequence. As there are at most f Byzantine
processes among {p0, . . . , pk} \ {pj}, we have j < k ≤ f +1. We show next that all correct
bakers decide by the end of round r + k.
Suppose first that pj is such that endorsableRoundpj ≥ lockedRoundq, for any correct
baker q. By Lemma 9, all correct bakers decide at the end of round r + j.
Suppose that there is a correct baker with a locked round higher than endorsableRoundpj .
Let q be the baker with the highest locked round among all correct bakers. In the round
at which pj proposes, that is, in round r + j, q sends a preendorsement QC that justifies
its locked round in the PREENDORSE phase (line 120). By Lemma 8, this preendorsement
QC is received by all correct bakers, who update in the ENDORSE phase of round r+ j+1
their endorsable round to q’s locked round at line 94.
If between rounds r + j + 1 and r + k − 1 no correct baker updates its locked round
then the proposer pk will have at round r+k that endorsableRoundpk ≥ lockedRoundq, for
any correct baker q. Again, by Lemma 9, we conclude that at the end of round r + k all
correct bakers decide.
If instead there is a correct baker that updated its locked round before round r + k,
then let q be the baker which updates it last, at some round r + j′ with j′ < k. When
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q changes its locked round, q has seen a prendorsement QC for round r + j′. This QC is
sent together with the Endorse message in the phase ENDORSE, and therefore it will be
received by all correct bakers at the beginning of the next phase PROPOSE. Thus every
correct baker, including pk, sets its endorsableRound to r + j
′. Because j′ is maximal, no
correct baker changes its locked round between rounds r+ j′+1 and r+ k− 1. Therefore,
at round r+ k, for any baker q, we have that lockedRoundq ≤ r+ j
′ = endorsableRoundpk .
Again, by Lemma 9 we conclude that at the end of round r+k all correct bakers decide. ⊓⊔
Theorem 6. Tenderbake satisfies termination.
Proof. We reason by contradiction. Suppose first there is a level ℓ ≥ 1 such that no correct
process decides at ℓ. Clearly, ℓ is minimal with this property.
We first show that eventually all correct processes are synchronized. As ℓ is minimal, we
have that there is at least one correct process that has decided at ℓ−1. Among the correct
processes that have decided at ℓ − 1, take p to be the one whose block at level ℓ − 1 has
the smallest round. As processes invoke the pull mechanism at regular intervals, there will
be a time (after τ) after which every correct process has received p’s last block. Because
this block has the smallest round every correct process will adopt it (line 27). This means
that eventually all correct processes will agree on all the block rounds for levels ℓ′ with
ℓ′ ≤ ℓ−1. This is because for levels ℓ′ < ℓ−1 there is agreement on the whole blocks, while
for ℓ′ = ℓ− 1 eventually there is agreement also on the block round, as just explained. We
can therefore apply Lemma 7 to obtain that there is a time after τ at which all correct
processes are synchronized.
Recall that the function ∆′ has the property that there is a round r such that ∆′(r) >
δ + 2ρ. As ∆′ is increasing, this property holds for all subsequent rounds as well. And,
given that all processes are synchronized from some time on, as proved in the previous
paragraph, we obtain that the hypothesis of Lemma 10 is satisfied. Therefore all correct
processes decide at ℓ, which contradicts the assumption that no correct process decides
at ℓ. In other words, we have proved that, for any level ℓ, there is at least one correct
process that decides at ℓ.
Finally, we show that for any level ℓ, any correct process eventually decides at ℓ. Suppose
that there is a correct process p that does not decide at some level ℓ ≥ 1. From the first
part of the proof we obtain that there is at least one other correct process q that eventually
decides at ℓ. Process q will eventually receive p’s pull request, will reply, and p will therefore
receive an endorsement QC for level ℓ which enables it to decide at ℓ. This contradicts the
assumption, and allows us to conclude. ⊓⊔
